Housing in North America: Peak Oil’s Primary Victim

Of the many asset classes to be victimized by the end of cheap energy, residential real estate is perhaps the most vulnerable. A call option on future wage growth, and, leveraged to our liquid-fuel based transport system, housing in North America is currently making its way back to the stable, but barely appreciating asset it once was. However, having started this journey only recently there is still a long way to go. A long way in price that is, for housing to fall.

The housing crash is currently in the midst of its next leg down. In similar fashion to those who missed the initial crash, the past year has seen a number of observers calling for a bottom. One of my favorite calls came last year from Karl Case in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal. In A Dream House for All, Mr Case made the following argument: because house prices had fallen so much already, housing was now more affordable. But of course that wasn’t true at all. Not then, and not now.

Mr. Case was mistakenly anchoring his viewpoint on price to the purchasing power which existed prior to the crash. Yes, surely, last Summer’s house prices—had they existed early last decade with its flowing credit and growing economy—would have not lasted long on the market. But late Summer 2010 was of course not 2004. Indeed, Mr. Case’s error goes to the heart of the problem: it’s not only the massive debt and negative equity that ails housing. It’s the economic conditions, an inflationary depression, that really controls housing’s fate. Our structural unemployment, our flat to declining wages, and our rising food and energy costs. Each of these keeps knocking down the price level of houses.

Mr. Case’s editorial is now 9 months old. House prices nationally have been falling again and in many cities rather steeply. Some metro regions are on pace to fall by 10% on the year. And so, to the point: housing was not more affordable last summer. Nor, as Mr Case put it, was it a bargain. And, it’s still not more affordable. In addition, housing starts are also carving out new lows as the massive supply of existing and foreclosed homes continues to obliterate the homebuilding business, as was reported just today.

House prices have still not reached the lower levels Americans can now afford. The continued replacement of high wage jobs, with their upwardly volatile partnership profits and bonuses, with lower wage jobs and their poor prospects for advancement, means there is no class of new homebuyers coming along to purchase the high priced homes of existing owners. This is especially true in the $700,000–$1,000,000 price level–a tranche of homes that came to dominate so many metro regions in the US, from Boston to Seattle. Oh sure, homes still transact at those price levels. Indeed, homes still transact at all price levels. But massive inventory languishes at all price levels and only transacts after continual price reductions.

As I have been remarking on Twitter the past few weeks, I believe the FED has a decision to make now about housing. Either they start to buy MBS again, attempting to force mortgage rates down to new all time low levels–or–they simply let housing “go.” Let’s be honest. There is really very little the FED or Congress can do to alter the course of housing. Moreover, Chairman Bernanke in his dolorous news conference several weeks ago also stated rather lucidly that “the FED cannot create more oil.” That too is very much to the point. Oil’s historic repricing, which occurred seven years ago when the new regime above $40 started to unfold, cannot be undone. And trying to run a housing, commuting, and workplace system on 100 dollar oil that was originally built out on 15 dollar oil has run into predictable trouble.

As explained in a previous post, there is not going to be a return to “normal” oil prices and accordingly there will be no return to “normal” wages or “normal” house prices. Many real estate markets in the 1980-2005 period were characterized by their trophy pricing, or Giffen Good pricing if you will. More broadly, beyond a positional asset conferring status, nearly all American houses became call options on future wage growth. In this context the 30 year mortgage made exact sense as the owner, at around the half-way point of the loan’s term, would find his earning’s power reaching escape velocity. And voila! — the monthly mortgage payment would then drop down to a much smaller portion of one’s income allowing the owner to consume even more (and maybe even buy a second home). Such were the pleasures of a growing economy, running on cheap energy.

That era is now over. For those who wish to forecast a recovery–a sustainable recovery–in US housing I would suggest you must also forecast a quick transition to a cheap energy source. One that can be adopted broadly, and which will allow us to run our system in some facsimile to its current iteration. Barring such, the prospects for a surge in new employment–and especially wages–remains low. The peak oil model for housing’s future prospects is now dominant.

-Gregor

  • gregor.us

    Link to a thread from the last post, which also touches upon the twin issue of property, and oil.

    http://gregor.us/economics/paper-vs-real-exit-from-normal-ecological-economics-and-probabilistic-regimes-in-one-chart/#comment-203243600

  • http://biophilic.blogspot.com/ Burk

     Thanks for an outstanding post.

  • Anonymous

     Straightforward and to the point. 

  • curlyhoward1

    h

  • Anonymous

    If I’m reading this correctly, we have two worlds: the financial world and the real world.  The financial world only intersects with the real world when it “cashes” in, ie. buying the hard assets to use for personal consumption.  So all that money supply in the financial world has no real impact until with the real world until it “cashes” in.  The future markets, stock markets, bonds, t bills, and the banks, all live in this financial.  When one buys the assets, if there is no replacement for that item, then this will cause a scarcity of that product.  In the 70′s, money supply went into wages that quickly cashed in for the hard assets.  In 2011, the money supply stays in the financial world with no real impact on inflation. 

  • http://twitter.com/darnoc Alexander U Conrad

    Great post Gregor. It seems your earlier observations re: built infrastructure are also quite relevant in this context. There appears to be no widespread commitment to transitioning from oil-dependent single family housing in the US. Here in China and elsewhere, that’s simply not the case. Simply put, the majority of new housing in China and the developing world is not shot into a built infrastructure that is nearly as oil dependent. 

    I don’t have a car here in Beijing….while it’s perhaps selfishly inconvenient at times, I get along just fine with transit and taxis. I’m also increasingly relying on HSR (largely nuclear and coal powered, of course) for short and medium distance trips. I could easily replicate this in many, many Chinese cities across a wide spectrum of housing choices. Could I replicate these options via a wide choice of housing in LA, Kansas City or many other American cities? I think not.

  • http://twitter.com/ianrmc Ian M

    The 17 million carbuyers this year in China disagree with you

  • http://twitter.com/darnoc Alexander U Conrad

    I understand what you are saying, but I can’t say that I agree. There are simply too many differences between US-China auto related behaviors to see similar exposure to peak oil in both countries.

    Buying behaviors:
    - China: 80% + 1st time buyers….large percentage of all sales paid in cash….market dominated by smaller, fuel efficient cars with strong niches (i.e. luxury market) 
    - US: Far greater focus on replacement vehicles….large percentage of sales enabled via credit…..remains a very large SUV/light truck market

    Driving behaviors:
    - Avg US driver at something like 12,000 k miles per year….in China, significantly less than half this number

    Alternatives:
    - China: urban density complementary to transit alternatives. In Beijing, your car is only available for your use 6 days a week….alternatives exist, AND sales continue to be strong. (i.e. factors like aspirational 1st time buying)
    - US: Built infrastructure in suburbia would make 6 day car availability an impossibility for millions, as one example.
    - HSR in China already a better option than driving for certain city pairs (example – Beijing-Tianjing 30 mins vs. 75-90 mins) and increasingly a better option than flying.

    Sure – China’s pace of auto sales will continue to be strong….but on absolute US/China comparisons (to say nothing of per capita), China still has a long way to go….and while this growth will indeed drive more demand for oil, the built infrastructure in China is simply far better positioned to withstand peak oil pressures on a comparative basis to the US.

  • gregor.us

    Yes, my view for several years is that China will act “as if” it can adopt the automobile as it was adopted 60-70 years ago in the West. But then the limits will appear more quickly, and they will appear as formidable.

    One of the miraculous features of strong forward motion in any system–in this case the Chinese economy–is that diverting that motion in a new direction can be powerful. For example, while I am negative on fast adoption of EV’s in the OECD….I would not be shocked to wake up one day to learn Chinese adoption of autos goes flat, as many choose EVs and the new rail system.

  • gregor.us

    Indeed, and that’s why in this household the target destination remains PDX. (Though I am bullish on SF Bay, and SEA in this regard too.)