Pacific Story

The revaluation of the Singapore Dollar this week is one of those quiet events that often precedes a larger, tectonic shift. First, it’s apt and fitting in a rather classical way that while most were focused on a coming revaluation of the Chinese Yuan, that “little” Singapore should move first. Second, the over-focus on the Yuan as an issue exclusively framed within a geo-political context has very much crowded out the larger issue of inflation, in the developing world. And finally, the question of revaluation in Asian currencies I think now has an answer: instead of a weaker currency through which to export goods, it may be time to have a stronger currency through which to import resources.

The naivete of Western leadership, especially in Washington, towards the developing world’s hunger for resources is very much part of an overall, generational philosophy that the US can always obtain energy cheaply while innovating its way to wealth. Oh yeah? As I am often known to ask: why, in the midst of the worst post-war recession, is oil at 85 dollars a barrel and not 15 dollars a barrel? This week I addressed some of these issues in a piece titled Pacific Story in StockTwits Macro Weekly, which is a new (and free) magazine in PDF form, that I edit in conjunction with StockTwits. | see: StockTwits Macro Weekly. The problem in its current form, as I see it, is that the developing world is once again racing ahead and driving up the price of resources–but that this forward-macro-thrust from the developing world hurts, more than helps, the economies of the OECD.

Appropriate also to this story is yet another flurry of resource deals, wherein China buys whatever energy deposits it can lay its hands on. Coal, Oil, Natural Gas. It doesn’t matter. China buys in Africa, China buys in South America, and China does deals with Russia. This week they are buying  in the Americas–most recently a new offer from CNOOC for offshore Brazilian oil, but more notably the deal that Sinopec struck Monday with ConocoPhillips for a large piece of Syncrude, in Canada.

The revaluation of the Singapore dollar, therefore, is the signal to look past the noise of Washington-Beijing politics over the Yuan, and realize that when the tipping point arrives China will will revalue because they have to. The long-awaited revaluation of Asian currencies appears to finally be at hand, but pay no attention to the Boston-Washington political-science class that ponders these changes from its axis of comfort. The stale, geo-political analysis that passes for expertise in the US has completely missed the deterministic underpinnings of oil and coal, and they will no doubt greet Asian currency revaluation as a kind of victory. Well sure, a victory for Asia. Because oil and coal producers from Africa to Russia, from Indonesia to Brazil will only be too delighted to set their prices based on Asian demand, accumulating those newly strong currencies in the process. As the world embarks on the next phase of the commodity bull market, Washington–populated by “our best and brightest”–has as one of its highest priorities that the USDollar become weaker, and that Asian currencies become stronger.

-Gregor

Further Reading: The Next Empire (China in Africa) by Howard French, in The Atlantic Magazine.

Photo: via W.M. Soo on flickr.

Update: Friday 16 April 2010 – (Reuters) China’s Hu says to let yuan float gradually.

  • http://twitter.com/chris23 chris arkenberg

    “…instead of a weaker currency through which to export goods, it may be time to have a stronger currency through which to import resources.”

    Great observations, Gregor. Reading the last line in your article I couldn't help wondering, half-jokingly, if the US might become the new cheap manufacturing hub for doodads & googaws to satisfy the growing Chinese middle-class consumer market…

  • http://steamcatapult.com/ Dave Pinsen

    Interesting. Your insight ties in with, and would seem to support, the “China Continental” thesis James Kynge articulated last year. I can imagine the recent developments in iron ore pricing would give China more impetus to revalue its currency.

  • http://economic-undertow.blogspot.com steve_from_virginia

    In order for China to assert currency hegemony in the manner you suggest the Chinese have to let the currency float.

    China's problem with a float is that there are too few yuan to actively circulate – not a problem with dollars. The apparent 'high' value that is proposed for the yuan is a reflection of the paucity or yuan in circulation – a 'scarcity premium' – that will disappear as yuan are emitted in the quantity required for it to be a reserve currency.

    Can China emit the yuan necessary without amplifying current China inflation? Over what time frame would the float take place? How would China cope with the risks that would emerge alongside its floating currency, which would allow speculators to attack it and its credit foundations?

    If China had a strong currency it would have floated a long time ago when the costs would have been moderate. It didn't and it is too late for it to do so. The outcome would be a yuan much like the euro, not hard enough to hold a primary peg to crude oil but hard enough to import deflation from the US.

    Which is the last thing China wants right now. Deflation would bankrupt its political elite and break the government. I suspect China talks about restraint while it keeps the stimulus/yuan creation pedal to the metal. It's grow or die in China.

    Meanwhile, the possible (likely) dollarization of the China economy – by NOT sterilizing dollars @ entry – opens the possibility of dollar preference in China leading to hyperinflation … which seems to be China's game as it is the only way the massive yuan debt overhand can be eroded..

    It's either that or a shattering deflationary collapse of China's real estate bubble … not a chance for that to happen. Take a long look over the entire world, not one country is allowing banks and lending to absorb legacy bad loans. Doing so is fatal so the bailouts will continue, regardless of cost.

    That votes for cheap yuan and creeping dollarization. Deflation in the US and other countries' carry trade ambitions.

  • RichL

    While a deflation in China is possible later, the problem now appears to be a labor shortage and wage inflation. See-

    http://demographymatters.blogspot.com/2008/03/c

    or

    http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/business/glob

    The current problem in China is not consistent with your outlook. On a PPP basis, the yuan is undervalued by ~ 50%, see -

    http://www.economist.com/markets/bigmac/display

    Getting the administered price currency to trade more in line with the values of the rest of the world is simply moving in the direction of least resistance. And if the managed float is in the direction of FEWER CNY per USD, how is issuing LESS of the CNY per USD going to create a flood of CNY?

  • http://economic-undertow.blogspot.com/ steve from virginia

    You can't jump to conclusions; the flood of yuan is well underway but is shifted to commodities, real estate speculation. Both are liquidity traps. Albert Edwards (Societe Generale) has made this observation:

    The deficit, of course, is one result of the massive Chinese stimulus package focused on infrastructure, which has sucked in massive amounts of commodities.

    And obviously Edwards thinks this is going to have serious ramifications.

    One of the key changes over the last year is the rate at which Chinese import growth now outstrips export growth (see left hand chart below). It is clear much of this is down to the rapid pace of commodity imports, associated with a step-up in infrastructure projects due to the fiscal stimulus programme, but also with stockbuilding. Hence we see total imports handsomely outstripping imports from countries that are not big commodity producers, such as the US and Europe.

    Edwards also makes the observation that the yuan has appreciated over the past four years without going into detail. Of late the three- way peg of dollar/crude/yuan would be the issue. Prior would be the outcome of divergent real interest rate regimes of the two countries.

    The entire article is interesting – doesn't mention hamburgers:

    http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/03/25/1873

  • http://economic-undertow.blogspot.com/ steve from virginia

    You can't jump to conclusions; the flood of yuan is well underway but is shifted to commodities, real estate speculation. Both are liquidity traps. Albert Edwards (Societe Generale) has made this observation:

    The deficit, of course, is one result of the massive Chinese stimulus package focused on infrastructure, which has sucked in massive amounts of commodities.

    And obviously Edwards thinks this is going to have serious ramifications.

    One of the key changes over the last year is the rate at which Chinese import growth now outstrips export growth (see left hand chart below). It is clear much of this is down to the rapid pace of commodity imports, associated with a step-up in infrastructure projects due to the fiscal stimulus programme, but also with stockbuilding. Hence we see total imports handsomely outstripping imports from countries that are not big commodity producers, such as the US and Europe.

    Edwards also makes the observation that the yuan has appreciated over the past four years without going into detail. Of late the three- way peg of dollar/crude/yuan would be the issue. Prior would be the outcome of divergent real interest rate regimes of the two countries.

    The entire article is interesting – doesn't mention hamburgers:

    http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/03/25/1873